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Jewish emancipation in nineteenth century Europe produced drastically diﬀer-
ent responses. In Germany, a liberal variant known as Reform developed, while
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This paper explores how economic development can lead to cultural change. In particular,
we investigate how economic incentives determine whether a minority community integ-
rates or attempts to resist the majority culture. To address this issue, we analyse the
emergence of Reform and ultra-Orthodox Judaism in nineteenth century Europe. Jewish
emancipation—the gradual lifting of formal and informal barriers to Jewish participation
in mainstream society—ﬁrst occurred in Germany. There, a liberal variant of Judaism
known as Reform emerged, based on ideas of the Enlightenment, becoming the dominant
form of Judaism in western Europe by the end of the nineteenth century. In eastern
Europe, traditional Judaism was reworked into various conservative forms of Judaism
which emphasized strict adherence to rabbinical law. These developments had long-lasting
eﬀects. The denominational diﬀerences within Judaism today stem from the series of
nineteenth century schisms that we analyze in this paper.1
To explain Jewish emancipation and schism we build on Iannaccone (1992) in developing
a club-goods model of religion in which a religious authority can impose prohibitions
on members which reduce their returns from outside activity. In so doing, a religious
authority faces a trade-oﬀ between a relatively aﬄuent community that expends little
eﬀort on religious participation and a poorer community that devotes a large amount of
time and eﬀort to religious activity. We develop a simple and tractable model of religious
organization to examine how political and economic development shape this trade-oﬀ.
The model sheds light on how diﬀerent economic regions reacted to emancipation. It
predicts that where emancipation is accompanied by economic development, it is optimal
for a religious authority to enable community members to engage in income-generating
activity outside the community in return for increased ﬁnancial contributions to the
community. Where there is emancipation without economic development, any potential
increase in ﬁnancial contributions from outside activity is not suﬃcient to compensate
religious authorities for the diminution in contributions of time and eﬀort to the group.
The historical case study provides a “quasi-natural experiment” that isolates the role
1Jewish religious identities are extremely persistent over time as Lasker and Lasker (1991) demonstrate.
According to the 2000/2001 National Jewish Population Survey 81 percent of Orthodox Jews were brought
up as Orthodox and 96 percent of Orthodox Jews marry other Orthodox Jews (National Jewish Population
Survey 2000-01. Strength, Challenge and Diversity in the American Jewish Population, 2003). This
persistence means that identities formed in the nineteenth century continue to shape Jewish religious
practice today.
1that economic incentives play in shaping culture. At the end of the eighteenth century all
Jewish communities ‘displayed substantially similar political, social, and economic features’
(Vital, 1999, 31). We document how an exogenous event, Jewish emancipation, upset this
equilibrium, producing drastically diﬀerent reactions among Jewish communities across
Europe, which less than a hundred years earlier had shared a common religious culture.
Other examples of religious countermovements such as the Amish and the Hutterite
communities do not allow us to address this question as cleanly, because they were
small and localized developments that began in isolated rural areas making it diﬃcult to
disentangle whether their rejection of modernization was due to the peculiarities of their
local culture or a product of the economic incentives that they faced.
We establish the following theoretical results. First, in a closed community, a religious
authority responds to emancipation by relaxing religious prohibitions in areas of high
economic development and by reinforcing religious prohibitions in areas of low economic
development. Second, when individuals have the ability to exit the community a non-
monotonicity is introduced. At intermediate levels of economic development it can be
optimal for religious authorities to enforce a high level of strictness: even though individuals
with low levels of attachment to the community are induced to exit, this is more than
compensated for by increased contributions of time and eﬀort by individuals with high
attachment to the community. We use these predictions to construct analytic narratives
of the emergence of the diﬀerent variants of modern Judaism—Reform, Orthodox, and
ultra-Orthodox Judaism.2
Finally, we explore a dynamic version of the model with intergenerational transmission
of values. For intermediate levels of development there exist endogenous cycles in the
strictness of religious communities. When the proportion of high-attachment types is low,
religious authorities favour a strategy of cultural resistance which induces all members to
exert high eﬀort. This causes the proportion of high-attachment types in the community
to increase. At some point it becomes optimal for the religious authority to switch to a
strategy of cultural integration as high-attachment types contribute a high proportion
2We will refer interchangeably to Haredi and ultra-Orthodox versions of Judaism. The latter is
the term used in the economic and sociological studies of Orthodox Judaism (e.g. Berman, 2000). The
former is a Hebrew term current in Israel. Haredi Jews themselves simply use the Yiddish term for
Jews (Yidn) or virtuous Jews (erlicher Yidn) (Heilman, 1992, 11–13). Hasidism is a subset of Haredi
Judaism. We provide details on the rise of Hasidism in Section 4. Hasidism was initially opposed to
traditional Judaism—the Misnagdim or opponents—but by the middle of the nineteenth century they
had overcome their diﬀerences in order to oppose Reform Judaism. Diﬀerent branches of ultra-Orthodox
Judaism espouse radically diﬀerent opinions on many political issues such the state of Israel but their
attitude towards secular society and Reform Judaism is similar.
2of their outside earnings to the community. In turn, as they exert low eﬀort within the
community, the proportion of high-attachment types declines until it becomes optimal
for the religious authority to switch back to a strategy of cultural resistance. This
novel result could potentially explain church-sect cycles in which religious communities
alternate between low and high strictness. Moreover, we show that concerns over the
intergenerational transmission of values make religious authorities more likely to adopt a
strategy of cultural resistance.
This paper is part of a growing literature on religious communities and religious extremism
that builds on the work of Iannaccone (1992). Berman (2000) shows how the subsidy
that ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups receive from the Israeli state has induced them to
intensify the level of sacriﬁce required to participate, and in particular, to extend the time
spent on yeshiva. Montgomery (1996, 2003), Barros and Garoupa (2002) and McBride
(2008, 2010) model denominational choice in a Hotelling framework. The problem we
consider is related to recent papers by Abramitzky (2008, 2009) who examines how Israeli
Kibbutz communities manage to implement egalitarian policies of income-sharing whilst
limiting shirking and preventing “too much” out-migration by high ability members. Our
dynamic analysis is most closely related to McBride (2007) who studies how religious
capital formation aﬀects donations to a religious community.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the historical background to
our paper. It sets out the details of Jewish emancipation and schism that need to be
explained. We formalize our theory of religious polarization in Section 3. In Section 4 we
apply this model to explain the historical evidence. Section 5 examines the dynamics of
the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 Emancipation, Reform and Schism
Before Emancipation
Traditional Judaism was organized around the local religious community.3 Jewish com-
munities underwent little internal change between the middle ages and the end of the
eighteenth century. As Jonathan Israel noted ‘by and large the essential similarities in
the institutions of Jewish organized life held true everywhere’ (Israel, 1985, 184).
3See Botticini and Eckstein (2005, 2007) for an economic analysis of how the development of rabbinical
Judaism aﬀected the economic and social proﬁle of Jewish communities in the early middle ages.
3Jewish communities spread out across central and eastern Europe during the middle ages.4
They provided the following club goods to their members: religious services centred on
the synagogue; a rabbinical court which adjudicated civil and criminal cases; collective
insurance in the form of a poor house and an inﬁrmary; and religious education through
the cheder where Hebrew and the Talmud were taught. A ritual slaughterer and bakery
assured that food was uncontaminated and bathhouses were maintained for ritual washing
(Rudavsky, 1967).
Across Europe, Jews faced special taxes and restrictions on their choice of occupation,
residency, marriage, and religious worship.5 From 1500 onwards, Jews across Italy and
Germany were conﬁned to ghettos. Ghettos prevented or restricted social interaction
between Christians and Jews.6 In eastern Europe, Jews lived in their own communities
and were not conﬁned to ghettos but the overall eﬀect was similar: they lived apart
from the majority Christian population, and spoke their own language.7 Developments
in the Christian world had little impact on the evolution of religious practice and belief
within Jewish communities. The restrictions Jews faced, limiting where they could work
and even whether or not they had permission to marry, served to minimize social and
economic interactions between Christian and Jewish communities.
Traditional Judaism was based on Jewish law (halakhah) as codiﬁed by rabbinical tradition
in addition to Mosaic law. These practices had evolved over the course of the centuries and
4We refer throughout to Ashkenazi Jews. It is estimated that European Jews, the preponderance of
whom were Ashkenazi made up four ﬁfths of the total Jewish population of 2.5 million at the end of the
eighteenth century (Dubnov, 1971, 447).
5C.f. Goldscheider and Zuckerman (1984, 13). Jewish residency rights was conditional on the goodwill
of the local ruler. The Jewish community of Vienna was expelled in 1670. Maria Theresa expelled
the Jewish community from Prague in 1744 (Vital, 1999, 1–4). See Dubnov (1971, 192–198) and Katz
(1974, 12–13). The so-called Pharaoh-law of 1726 meant that only the eldest son of a Jewish family was
permitted to marry and settle in Moravia and Bohemia (Dubnov, 1971, 188–189).
6The ghettos were overcrowded and disease-prone. For example, the Jewish population of Frankfurt,
which numbered more than 3000 people by the early eighteenth century, was conﬁned to a single street, a
quarter of a mile long and no more than twelve feet wide. As a result, ﬁres were frequent, and in the
1780s the mortality rate was 58 percent higher amongst the Jewish population than it was for non-Jews
(Ferguson, 1998, 27–38). Kaplan (2007), however, argues that in general ghettos prevented widespread
religious persecution or pogroms. Ghettoization preserved Jewish culture: ‘it stimulated the development
of a richer, more comprehensive, more distinctly Jewish culture’ (Kaplan, 2007, 318). C.f. Low (1979)
who notes ‘[r]ecurrent expulsions encouraged maintenance of ties with kinfolk in other countries and kept
Jewish solidarity alive’ (Low, 1979, 13).
7In most of Eastern Europe Jews spoke Yiddish. In Germany, Jews spoke a dialect: Judendeutsch.
‘Until quite modern times, few Jews in any part of Europe had more than such a limited knowledge of the
language of a country, namely the language of their gentile neighbors, as might be necessary to conduct
commercial transactions with them. Even this rarely extended to the ability to read and write in the
vernacular’ (Vital, 1999, 21–22).
4reﬂected the precarious position of the Jews as a unique minority group within Christian
society. The halakhah regulated the religious life of all Jewish communities. Traditions
emerged so as to enable Jews to coexist as a minority group within Christian society
whilst preserving their identity. Observant Jews were allowed to interact with gentiles
and even visit their houses in order to sell goods to them but they were not allowed to eat
together. Jewish women were not allowed to be alone with non-Jewish men. Distinctive
forms of Jewish dress evolved which identiﬁed community members as Jews. These were
‘considered tokens of the individual’s membership in his community and testimony to
his identiﬁcation with his faith’; they had the practical eﬀect of inhibiting integration
between Jews and mainstream society (Katz, 1998, 50).8
Emancipation
Jewish communities across Europe were bound by a complex system of discriminatory
restrictions and regulations.9 This began to change at the end of the eighteenth century
with Jewish emancipation. The process of emancipation resulted in Jews eventually
obtaining equal civic and political rights by the third quarter of the nineteenth century.
Jewish emancipation can be viewed as a largely exogenous shock. Few Jews ‘anywhere
in Europe had anticipated emancipation’ (Vital, 1999, 99). However, once it had begun,
emancipation transformed traditional Jewish communities: it ‘augured unprecedented
but also irreversible change in the structure and character of the Jewish people. From
this point on, the questions on which virtually everything of importance in the lives of
the Jews of Europe would turn was whether, if only as a hypothesis, such a change was
to be the welcomed or rejected; and whether the welcome—or rejection—was to be ﬂat
or qualiﬁed. Upon these issues Jews in all parts of the continent would now begin to be
deeply and, in the course of time, irreparably divided’ (Vital, 1999, 99).
The process of emancipation was inaugurated by Christian Wilhelm Dohm’s 1781 work,
8Prior to emancipation, ‘internal restrictions of the kinds of clothes Jews could wear were a form
of ‘foreign policy’. Dark and inconspicuous clothing was seen as appropriate to Jews living in this long
and bitter exile, and wearing “Gentile clothing” was explicitly equated with immodesty and immorality.
Implicitly, the accommodation choice of modest dress suggested that Jews would not seek power or
position in the state’ (Hundert, 2004, 87). Furthermore, Jews who wore luxurious clothing, or made
visible displays of wealth, imposed a negative externality on the community, as a whole, because if
Christian rulers supposed that the Jews were rich this could led to the imposition of higher taxes or
forced loans.
9The exceptions to this generalization were Britain and the Netherlands where Jews had been granted
eﬀective civic equality in the seventeenth century. Our focus in this paper is on the much larger Jewish
communities of central and eastern Europe.
5entitled ¨ Uber die b¨ urgerliche Verbesserung der Juden (On the Civic Improvement of the
Jews), which began a pan-European debate on the condition of the Jews in Europe by
advocating emancipation as a means to make the Jews useful to society at large (Hess,
2002).10 The ﬁrst signiﬁcant oﬃcial act of emancipation took place in central Europe
when Joseph II (1780–1790), ruler of the Habsburg empire, issued the Edit of Toleration
or Toleranzpatent in 1782. It was an act of partial emancipation which granted certain
civic rights to Jews provided that they attended secular schools and learn German; it did
not grant Jews legal equality with Christians.11 Jewish settlement in Vienna, for example,
remained restricted and no public synagogues were allowed to be built (Low, 1979, 15-23).
A more complete form of emancipation resulted from the French Revolution. The doctrine
of equal citizenship proclaimed by the Revolutionaries led the National Assembly to
declare that Jews were full citizens in 1791 and this policy was spread across Europe with
the armies of France during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars (Berkovitz, 1989,
111–114). Jews across western Germany, the Low Countries, and northern Italy gained
full civic equality as a result of French conquest and a window of opportunity opened
up enabling many Jews to leave the ghettos and begin careers in areas such as law or
in government which had previously been closed to them. However, in 1808 some of the
rights granted by the French were restricted by Napoleon and, after his defeat in 1815,
many of the traditional restrictions on Jewish settlement and on the occupations Jews
could have were reimposed in those states that had been conquered by France, and in
some instances new, more severe, laws were introduced.12
A few German states did make permanent movements towards emancipation. The Duchies
of Anhalt-Berburg and Anhalt-K¨ othen granted the Jews ‘[e]mancipation virtually without
qualiﬁcations’ in 1810 (Rurup, 1969, 75). Prussia followed France in granting Jews a
limited form of citizenship in 1812 as part of the modernization programme imposed in
the aftermath of Napoleon’s victory at Jena.13 Mecklenburg followed Prussia in 1813
10This cameralist strain of thought argued that the Jews could be more usefully employed so as to
beneﬁt the body politic if they were freed and integrated. Traditional Jewish religious practice was
considered corrupting. For example Dohm ‘would go so far as to concede that the Jews were more morally
corrupt, criminally inclined, and antisocial than other peoples ...Using ‘sophistic artistry,” rabbinical
exegesis had falsiﬁed Mosaic Law and had introduced “narrow-minded and petty regulations” to the
Jewish religion’ (Berkovitz, 1989, 26).
11It was not in fact the ﬁrst Edit of Toleration, the Margrave of Baden, Karl Friedrich had issued a
similar document, granting Jews some rights but not citizenship in 1781 (Goldstein, 1984, 47).
12For example Jews were expelled from Bremen and L¨ ubeck in 1816. Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hanover,
Nassau and other territories reinstated settlement regulations in the aftermath of the defeat of Napoleon
(Jersch-Wenzel, 1997, 29).
13Jews in Prussia were still prevented from working in government and Judaism was not recognized as
6(Sorkin, 1987, 29). Denmark granted Jews civic rights in 1814.
Substantive moves towards legal equality in the rest of Germany recommenced in the
1830s and 1840s. Political emancipation was accompanied, and in cases some preceded, by
economic integration. Economic change, combined with the end of the legal restrictions
on settlement and employment, provided tremendous opportunities for many, even though
numerous German states, such as W¨ urttemberg, retained restrictions on Jewish settlement
until the late 1860s, and the process of emancipation was only completed with the
uniﬁcation of Germany.14
Joseph II had been among the ﬁrst European rulers to move towards emancipation but his
successors, notably Francis II (1792–1835), imposed a number of additional impositions
on Jews.15 Jews in the Habsburg empire only obtained full emancipation in 1868.16
Emancipation did not occur in the Russian empire. In the ﬁrst half of the nineteenth
century additional restrictions were imposed on Jewish communities and, from 1804
onwards, Jews were conﬁned to the Pale of Settlement (Greenberg, 1976).
Reform Judaism
There were three reforming movements in nineteenth century Judaism. Each advocated
far reaching changes in the practice of Judaism. The ﬁrst Reform movement emerged in
Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century.17 It was associated with the career of
a religion. Nevertheless, the partial emancipation of Prussian Jews was signiﬁcant because they were
viewed as ‘the culturally most advanced community of Jews in Western Europe’ and because it was not
subsequently revoked (Katz, 1974, 170).
14The last state to extend rights to Jews was Bavaria which did so when it ratiﬁed the new German
constitution in 1872. The relationship between emancipation, industrialization, and religious change
are the subject of a extensive historiography and considerable controversy. See Baron (1938); Berkovitz
(1989); Graetz (1996); Vital (1999). The seminal work on the cultural impact of emancipation of the
Jewish communities of central and eastern Europe was Katz (1972, 1974, 1986). This sparked a series of
debates about how to conceptualize the process of emancipation and assimilation that are contained in
the conference volumes Towards Modernity (Katz, 1987), Assimilation and Community (Frankel and
Zipperstein, 1992), Paths of Emancipation (Birnbaum and Katznelson, 1995), and Jewish Emancipation
Reconsidered (Brenner et al., 2003).
15In the major towns of Galicia, Jews were conﬁned to Ghettos for the ﬁrst time. See Katz (1974,
163–164) and Mahler (1985, 3–10).
16For consistency we refer to the territories ruled by the House of Habsburg as the Habsburg empire.
Strictly speaking, we should refer to the Austrian Empire for the years 1804-1867 and Austria-Hungary
for the period between 1867 and 1914.
17The most important precursor to Reform was the haskala movement begun by Moses Mendelssohn
(1729–1786). The haskala drew on European and, more speciﬁcally, German Enlightenment thought.
It applied the tools of critical reasoning to religion, particularly ‘the mode of thought that subjected







1810 Reform temple built in Seesen.
1819 Hamburg temple founded
1812 Prussian Jews
gain civil rights
1815 Jews in territories occupied.
by France lose their rights
1825









1850 Modern Orthodox congregation
established in Frankfurt
1867 Jews emancipated in
Habsburg empire
1869 Ultra-Orthodoxy secede in Hungary
1872 Jews emancipated across Germany
1876 Prussian Orthodox Jews
permitted to break from Reform
1875
Figure 1: A brief timeline of emancipation, Reform and schism
1
Figure 1: The timeline of emancipation, Reform and schism. Sources see text.
Israel Jacobson (1768–1828), a prominent advocate of secular education and of preaching
in the vernacular, and with the ﬁrst German-language Jewish periodical Sulamith (Meyer,
1988, 28–32). Jacobson built a new religious building in Dessau which he called a Temple
rather than a synagogue and in which the service was accompanied by choral songs and
German prayers and sermons (Meyer, 1988, 42–43).18
A second Reform movement built on this precedent by establishing a Temple in Hamburg
in 1818 and dedicating a new prayer book, ‘the ﬁrst comprehensive Reform liturgy’ (Meyer,
1988, 56). Reform ﬁnally gained momentum in the 1830s and 1840s with the third Reform
movement when Ludwig Philippson (1811–1889), a moderate reformer was appointed
preacher in Magdeburg, and when a more radical advocate of religious reform, Abraham
Geiger (1810–1874) obtained the rabbinate of Breslau in 1840. The ﬁrst Reform society
formed in 1843, and, at the behest of Philippson, a series of rabbinical conferences were
called, in Brunswick in 1844, in Frankfurt-am-Main in 1845, and in Breslau in 1846, to
consolidate the various strands of Reform and establish what the movement stood for.
The timeline of both Reform and emancipation is depicted in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows
those parts of Germany where Jews were either emancipated in 1825 or where they had
been emancipated during the period of French rule.19 Figure 3 depicts the German states
(Vital, 1999, 137). It was an elite movement based around a small group of Berlin Jews – the Maskilim
or young enlighteners – who applied historical and philological techniques to the study of Hebrew. This
developed into a critique of rabbinical Judaism. Representative thinkers include Saul Ascher (1767–1822)
author of Leviathan, or On Religion with Respect to Judaism, and David Friedl¨ aender (1750–1834).
18The signiﬁcance of renaming a synagogue a ‘Temple’ was that it implied that the community had
come to terms with the loss of the Temple of Jerusalem in A.D. 70 and was giving up on the hope of
returning to Israel.
19Many German Jews—including many reformers—ﬁrst experienced emancipation during the period
8where Reform communities had sprung up as measured by whether or not they sent rabbis
to any of the Reform conferences held in Brunswick in 1844, Frankfurt-am-Main in 1845,
or Breslau in 1846.20 Even where movements towards Reform preceded emancipation,
as in the case of Jacobson and the Sulamith, these can be interpreted as products of the
‘mood of anticipation’ that had been created by Napoleon’s conquests: both were based
in Dessau which joined Napoleon’s Confederation of the Rhine in 1807 (Sorkin, 1987).21
The content of Reform Judaism diﬀered from that of traditional Judaism in a number of
ways. Many traditional Jewish rites and rituals were abandoned by Reform congregations.
The bar mitzvah was replaced by conﬁrmation. Reform congregations introduced new
liturgies, replaced traditional chanting and praying with singing, and either reformed
or abandoned many traditional Jewish rites and rituals. Choirs and organ music were
introduced into the synagogue (Lowenstein, 1981, 270).22
Reform meant fundamentally reinterpreting the Jewish religion—separating out the
biblical commandants from the later rabbinical injunctions that comprised most of Jewish
law. The aim of this religious change was to enable Jews to accommodate themselves to
Christian or secular society. Reform allowed Jews to enjoy the beneﬁts of modern secular
society without abandoning all of their traditions or leaving their communities. Jews ‘who
deviated from the Jewish way of life under the pressure of these conditions solved their
problem by limiting the demands of religion along Reform principles’ (Katz, 1998, 50).
of French occupation so it is worth distinguishing those regions of Germany where some form of
emancipation occurred before 1825 from those where no emancipation took place, even though, in many
areas, emancipation was subsequently reversed.
20Lowenstein (1981) provides information on the 38 German based rabbis who attended at least one of
these conferences. Of these 40 percent came from territories where Jews had obtained civic emancipation
and 63 percent came from territories in which Jews had been emancipated at some point between 1800
and 1825. This is an imperfect indication of the relationship between emancipation and reform because
the size of each community could vary greatly.
21In cities like Frankfurt, Reform was driven by men like Samuel Holdheim (1806–1860) who were
interested in attempting to reverse the reimposition of legal restrictions on Jews that had occurred across
much of Germany in 1815. To obtain legal equality, they felt they needed to change the public perception
of Judaism and to ‘project an image of being worthy of those rights’ (Liberles, 1985, 31). Similarly, David
Fr¨ ankel urged Jews to abandon their traditional trades (which were perceived to be corrupting) and
become farmers and agriculturalists (see Sorkin, 1987).
22Some Reform communities considered abandoning circumcision. Olry Terquem argued that the
Sabbath should be moved from Saturday to Sunday (Goldfarb, 2009, 128).
9(a) Emancipation
Figure 2: Jewish communities in Germany that experienced civic emancipation in the
ﬁrst part of the nineteenth century. Data from Acemoglu et al. (2010).
(a) Reform Communities
Figure 3: The German Reform communities that sent rabbis to the Rabbinical Conferences
of 1844 to 1846. Data from Lowenstein (1981).
10Members of Reform communities did not necessarily consume less religion than members
of traditional Judaism had done—Reform was accompanied by an ambitious programme of
synagogue building—but they consumed religion in a diﬀerent form. Speciﬁcally, Reform
made less demands on the time of community members. In the words of one advocate of
Reform,
‘[m]any petty regulations such as the prohibition of shaving, the requirement
that women wear Scheitels (wigs) the institution of the Mikvah (ritual bath)
as an adjunct of the synagogue, and customs like Tashlikh (propitiatory rite
based on the literal interpretation of Micah 7:19 b) and Kapparoth Schlagen
(substitution of a fowl for a human being as a means of atonement) lost all
religious meaning’ (Cohon, 1922, 36).
Hence we refer to Reform Judaism as an example of cultural integration.23 This is
consistent with the views of both critics and advocates of Reform. Joseph Wolf, a leading
reformer described one of the purposes of Reform as demonstrating ‘that Judaism in its
reconstructed pristine form “is not in the least harmful to the individual or to bourgeois
society”’ (quoted in Sorkin, 1987, 36). A conservative opponent of Reform, Hermann
Schab referred to Reform as ‘an attempt to level down the Jewish synagogue Service to
that of the Protestant Church’ (Schwab, 1950, 26).
Polarization and Schism
As a result of Reform, the common religious culture shared by all Jews in central and
eastern Europe became fragmented. A process of religious and cultural polarization took
place between Jewish communities in eastern and western Europe. While communities in
Germany adopted Reform or moderate forms of Orthodoxy, in the Russian empire there
was no emancipation, and traditional forms of Judaism could remain largely intact.
In parts of the Habsburg empire this process of polarization brought about religious schism
as individual religious communities broke apart. In Hungary both a reform-movement and
the most partisan form of ultra-Orthodoxy emerged. Ultra-Orthodoxy was diametrically
23We use the neutral term cultural integration to describe this process of ‘cultural acculturation’. It is
not the same as cultural assimilation. The term “assimilation” is controversial in this context because
it ‘implies that the vast majority of Jews sought to fuse with other Germans in the desire to give up
their religious or cultural distinctiveness. It suggests a kind of submission, an exchange of “Jewishness”
for Germanness,” and perpetuates contemporary negative stereotypes that German Jews felt no Jewish
solidarity’ (Kaplan, 1991, 11).
11opposed to Reform: while Reform sought to change Judaism in order to accommodate
changes in the outside world, ultra-Orthodoxy reformed Judaism in such a way as to
insulate it from these changes. Ultra-Orthodoxy was a form of cultural resistance. Reform
sought a common ground between Judaism and Christianity; ultra-Orthodox communities
emphasized features that distinguished them from outsiders. Reform facilitated relations
with non-Jews; ultra-Orthodoxy imposed new proscriptions and prohibitions on their
members. It emphasized strictness (in Hebrew machmir) and ﬁxed traditional practices
as matters of religious law, blurred biblical and rabbinical injunctions and elevated the
importance of prohibitions restricting contact with outsiders.
This historical narrative raises a number of puzzles. Why did emancipation result in a
lessening of religious prohibitions and strictness in some communities and the strengthening
of prohibitions and strictness in others? The existing literature can explain a movement
in one direction but cannot generate the splintering of Judaism in diﬀerent directions that
we observe historically. The rest of the paper will be dedicated to developing a model that
can explain the diﬀering responses to emancipation among Jewish communities across
Europe.
3 A Model of Religious Polarization
In this section, we develop a model of religious polarization that builds on the club-
goods theory of religious organization, introduced by Iannaccone (1992). In our model,
individuals choose how much eﬀort and money to allocate to secular consumption and
how much to contribute to the production of a religious club good. Through religious
prohibitions, religious leaders can eﬀectively ‘tax’ opportunities to earn income outside
of the group and thereby induce members of the community to redirect eﬀort toward
production of the religious club good. In the presence of production complementarities,
Iannaccone (1992) shows that religious prohibitions which diminish members’ outside
opportunities may enhance an agent’s welfare by more closely aligning the privately
and socially optimal contributions to the religious club good. This rationalizes many of
the prohibitions and dietary restrictions that characterize orthodox variants of Judaism.
However, the theory of religious club goods has not been extended to explain religious
polarization. Why did some Jewish communities respond to emancipation by liberalizing
and becoming less strict, while others enforced traditional prohibitions? Why did schism
occur in some communities?
12To address these questions and more generally analyze the impact of economic development
on religion, we explore three main departures from Iannaccone’s (1992) model. First,
religious organizations in our model are not utilitarian planners—they only care about
their members’ religious participation and impose prohibitions to maximize members’
contributions of eﬀort to group production. This means that production complementarities
in religious groups are not required for our results and we do not assume them here.
Second, members have the option of exiting the community. This constrains the ability of
religious groups to impose prohibitions and induce higher contributions to production of
the club good. Finally, we analyze a dynamic extension of the model with overlapping
generations and intergenerational transmission of values.
The Model
Consider a game played by n individual agents and a religious authority. Agents choose
whether to join the religious community (there is only one), and divide eﬀort between
income-generating activity outside the community and production of a religious club good
within the community. Earned income can be spent on a consumption good or donated
to the community. Eﬀort and money contributions to the community are combined
to produce the religious club good. To induce agents to redirect eﬀort towards group
production, the religious authority can impose prohibitions, e.g. dress, dietary and
behavioral restrictions, that stigmatize agents in the broader society. These prohibitions
act as a ‘tax’ on outside income-generating activity by its members. We shall refer to the
degree of prohibitions imposed by the group as its level of strictness.
Let us begin by analyzing the following one-shot game without an option to exit from the
group:
Date 0. An agent can be one of two types denoted by θ, where θ = L is a type with
low attachment to the community and θ = H is a type with high attachment to the
community. The proportion of type-H agents in the population is p ∈ (0,1).
Date 1. The religious authority announces a level of strictness τ ∈ [0,1].24
24In our historical application the strictness parameter τ reﬂects how rigorously religious authorities
interpreted Jewish law. A high value of τ can thus be thought of as consisting of prohibitions that
emphasize a distinctive Jewish identity and were likely to increase the discrimination that Jews faced
in Christian or secular society. The religious authority had discretion over how strictly this could be
interpreted. A high value of τ corresponds to the rabbinical concept of Humrah (stringency) whereas a
low value of τ corresponds to the concept of kullah (lenience). In Section 4 we discuss how τ acted as a
barrier to Jewish integration.
13Date 2. Agents then choose to devote eﬀort e ∈ [0,1] to the production of a religious
club good. Eﬀort 1 − e is devoted to income-generating activity outside the community.
Income equals (1 − τ)λ(1 − e), where λ is a productivity parameter. It shall become
clear that λ is a natural measure of economic development in our model. Strictness τ
acts as a linear tax on income-generating activity outside the community. Income can
be divided between consumption of a unique non-storable good with unit price and a
ﬁnancial contribution to the community. Let c be the quantity consumed of the secular
good and g be the amount of income donated to the religious community.
Date 3. Output of the religious club good is produced by a combination of members’
eﬀort and money contributions.
We shall now proceed to specify payoﬀs. The utility function for each type-θ agent who







where σ < 1. R is a measure of the agent’s overall contribution to the religious club good
and we assume βH > βL > 0 so that high-attachment types derive greater enjoyment from
contributing to production of the club good. For simplicity, we assume that R = e+g, the
sum of the agent’s eﬀort and money contributions. We view the payoﬀ from contributing
to the religious club good as a combination of (i) warm glow, (ii) community status and
(iii) rewards in terms of allocation of the ﬁnal club good.
The budget constraint is:
c + g ≤ (1 − τ)λ(1 − e), (2)
which will bind in equilibrium, because (1) is strictly increasing in c. Therefore, c =
(1 − τ)λ(1 − e) − g.
Substituting the expressions for c and R into (1) we get:
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We assume that e = g = τ = 0 for individuals who exit the community, i.e. they cannot
contribute eﬀort or money to production of the religious club good, and they do not
face the tax τ on outside activity. Substituting this into (3) yields a payoﬀ of λ from








Figure 4: Strictness τ as a function of economic development λ.
Unlike in prior work, the religious authority is not a utilitarian planner, but instead
attempts to maximize religious participation. In particular, we assume that the religious








where in equilibrium ei and gi will depend on τ.
Equilibrium
The ﬁrst tradeoﬀ faced by a religious authority in setting the community’s level of
strictness τ is between contributions of eﬀort and money. A higher τ diminishes agents’
income-generating opportunities outside of the community, inducing them to redirect
eﬀort to production of the religious club good. However, this also means that they have
less income to donate to production of the religious club good. Analyzing the version of
the game without an exit option from the religious community allows us to focus on this
tradeoﬀ.
According to the following proposition, the strategy adopted by a religious authority will
depend on the level of economic development faced by members of its community.
Proposition 1 Development & Religion: There exists a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium (SPE) of the game without exit, characterized by a threshold for development









Figure 5: Equilibrium eﬀort contributions
e∗(τ∗) as a function of economic development
λ.
g∗(τ∗)








Figure 6: Equilibrium money contributions
g∗(τ∗) as a function of economic development
λ.
(i) For λ ≤ e λ, every SPE implements:
τ
∗ = 1, e
∗
i = 1 and g
∗
i = 0,
for all i ∈ N.
(ii) For λ > e λ, every SPE implements:
τ
∗ = 0, e
∗










for each i ∈ N.
Proofs of all propositions are provided in the appendix.
Proposition 1 describes how the character of a religious community can shift with an
increase in development, from eﬀort-intensive to money-intensive modes of production. The
intuition behind this result is as follows. Through religious prohibitions religious leaders
can eﬀectively ‘tax’ outside activities and thereby induce the members of the community to
redirect eﬀort toward production of the religious club good. When economic development
is low the gains to the religious authority associated with lowering τ and thereby increasing
monetary contributions g are small compared to the foregone contributions in terms
of eﬀort. Thus the optimal level of strictness τ∗ is equal to its maximum value at
low levels of economic development λ. This is depicted in Figure 4. When economic
development is high the increased ﬁnancial contributions from a richer congregation more
16than compensate for the lower levels of eﬀort. Once economic development reaches e λ,
the religious authority switches to τ∗ = 0. The best response of community members to
religious authority’s choice of τ is depicted in Figures 5 and 6.
This result accords with cross-sectional evidence on religious denominations. Richer
congregations make lower demands in terms of time-consuming rituals and rely more
heavily on the services of professional ministers, teachers, choir directors and caretakers
(Iannaccone, 1998, 1480). The following corollary analyzes the determinants of the
switching threshold e λ.
Corollary The threshold for switching to money-intensive contributions, e λ, is:
(i) strictly decreasing in the proportion of high-attachment types, p,
(ii) strictly decreasing in the attachment levels for each type, βL and βH.
The reasoning behind this result is as follows. When τ = 1, all agents choose the maximal
level of eﬀort contribution e = 1, regardless of their type. When τ = 0, each agent
contributes instead by donating to the community and their money contributions are
increasing in their attachment to the community. Hence, a money-intensive form of club
good production is relatively more attractive than an eﬀort-intensive form of production
when the proportion of high-attachment types p and the attachment levels of each type
are suﬃciently high.
In this section, we have demonstrated that cultural polarization can arise between religious
communities in diﬀerent regions. For a schism to occur in a single community, however,
agents need to have the option to exit the community.
Schism
When agents have the option to exit, the religious authority may be constrained in its
choice of strictness. In particular, setting a high τ may induce low-attachment types
to leave the community—a religious schism. Hence, the religious authority faces a new
trade-oﬀ: relax prohibitions to keep low-attachment types in the community or induce
their exit and cater to a smaller, stricter, poorer and more committed community. The
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Figure 7: Strictness τ as a function of economic development λ when agents have an exit
option.
Lemma 1 Exit Constraint. The following applies for both types of agents θ = L,H.
(i) For λ ≤ β
1/σ











σ , there exists a unique threshold τθ ∈ (0,1), such that
all type-θ agents exit the community if and only if τ > τθ.
The threshold τθ is strictly decreasing in economic development λ and strictly
increasing in βθ. Hence τH > τL.
When economic development is low, all agents will remain in the group, regardless of its
level of strictness. However, as economic development reaches an intermediate level, the
exit constraint begins to bind. An agent’s ‘tolerance for strictness’, τθ, is then decreasing
in economic development and increasing in her attachment to the group.25
We can now analyze the equilibria of the game when agents have the option to exit
the community. The following proposition states that if low types have suﬃciently low
attachment, then such a schism occurs for intermediate levels of development.








σ . For such high levels of economic development, agents switch to money-intensive
contributions and the religious authority has an incentive to set τ = 0. At τ = 0, no agent will exit the
community—they can do at least as well by remaining in the community and setting e∗ = g∗ = 0. Hence
the exit constraint will not bind in this case.
18Proposition 2 Schism: Consider the game with exit. For βL suﬃciently low, there
exists a unique SPE as follows:
(i) For λ ≤ β
1/σ
L , every agent remains a member of the community and equilibrium
actions are as in Proposition 1(i).
(ii) There exist unique thresholds λ and λ, such that for all β
1/σ
L < λ < λ every agent
remains a member of the community and:
τ















i = 0 for all i ∈ N.
For λ ≤ λ ≤ λ, there is a schism. Only high-attachment types remain members of
the community and:
τ
















(iii) For λ > λ, all agents remain members of the community and equilibrium actions
are as in Proposition 1(ii).
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. Economic development increases the
incentive that individuals, especially low-attachment individuals, have to exit the com-
munity and participate in the outside economy (see Lemma 1). Therefore, the religious
authority lowers τ as economic development increases in order to retain low-attachment
types. This is costly for the religious authority because it means that the amount of
eﬀort that is devoted to production of the religious club good declines for both types.
At an intermediate level of λ it becomes prohibitively costly to retain low-attachment
types. It is possible for the religious authority to generate higher aggregate contributions
to the religious club good by raising τ, and thereby inducing greater eﬀort from the
remaining high-attachment types, even though low-attachment types exit the community.
Consequently, there exists an intermediate range of λ, (λ,λ), such that the religious
authority will increase τ to maximize religious participation from H-types as shown in
Figure 7. In other words, there is a religious schism. As the level of economic development
becomes high, however, the religious authority switches to τ = 0. All agents join the
group and switch to money-intensive contributions.26
26Alternatively, we could conduct the analysis with high and low ability types. The results of the one-
shot game when agents diﬀer in their ability are qualitatively similar. When economic development is high,
194 The Model Applied to the History
Emancipation and Reform
In this section we apply our model to explain the emergence of Reform and ultra-Orthodox
Judaism in nineteenth century Europe. Prior to emancipation all Jewish communities
had few economic opportunities: they faced a low level of λ. Isolated from mainstream
society, communities in diﬀerent parts of central and eastern Europe shared a common
religious culture. Emancipation, however, exposed community members to contrasting
outside opportunities depending on the economic development of the region. The level of
economic development across central and eastern Europe varied considerably: per capita
GDP in Germany was approximately twice that in what is now Poland.27 Exposure
to diﬀerent economic environments produced diﬀerent cultural reactions. Proposition
1 predicts that emancipation in a region where economic development was high should
generate a movement towards cultural integration. In order to illustrate this insight we
consider the case of Germany.
Emancipation was a necessary but not suﬃcient condition for Reform to succeed. Reform
was possible ﬁrst of all because rabbis could in principle alter the strictness of their
religious community. Many aspects of traditional Jewish practice had evolved gradually
over time and religious law aﬀorded considerable room for interpretation. As noted earlier,
Jews wore distinctive clothes but this was a matter of tradition rather than religious
law. Therefore Reformers could argue that Jewish dress and clothing ‘were not actually
anchored in halakhic sources, and they could be abandoned with the changing conditions’
(Katz, 1998, 50).
Reform could succeed because emancipation coincided with an upsurge in the German
economy. The German economy did not begin to industrialize until after 1850 but the
the religious authority induces members to switch to money intensive contributions by relaxing strictness.
One diﬀerence is the tradeoﬀ faced by the religious authority when exit is an option. High-ability types,
like low-attachment types, have an incentive to leave the community when economic development is
suﬃciently high. High-ability types however earn higher incomes and hence may make greater ﬁnancial
contributions to the community, even if they have lower attachment to the community. This means that
while schisms can still occur, the religious authority raises strictness and induces the exit of high-ability
types for a smaller range of values for λ.
27According to Angus Maddison’s calculations per capita GDP in 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars was
$1,839 in Germany in 1870, and $946 and $931 in what are now Poland and Romania, respectively
(Maddison, 2003). In the nineteenth century the territory of modern Poland belonged to Russia, Prussia
and the Habsburg empires. Modern Romania roughly corresponds to the Habsburg province of Galicia.
20period between the end of the Napoleonic wars and the onset of industrialization was
characterized by commercial expansion and economic growth along Smithian lines. This
growth process created opportunities for Jews—even prior to formal emancipation—as the
gradual transformation of the economic and legal institutions of the ancien regime resulted
in the ‘steady erosion of (Christian) guild privileges and monopolies, a growing freedom of
choice of occupation, and with it a larger element of ...social mobility’ (Mosse, 1987, 31).
Discriminatory barriers that had limited interaction between Jews and Christian were
eroded away by economic incentives to participate in an expanding economy (Richarz,
1975).
Emancipation plunged Jewish communities in Germany into a high λ environment which
provided economic opportunities for minorities willing to seize them. As Schofer writes:
‘the economic opportunities of the post-1848 boom encouraged large numbers of Jews
to leave the small-town economy and to enter the urban, national one, (Schofer, 1981,
81). Jewish community leaders now faced a diﬀerent set of incentives: ‘[i]nter-action with
non-Jews, which had been the exception, often deliberately avoided, now became the
inescapable norm’ (Pulzer, 1992, 5).
Reform took hold in those parts of Germany where economic opportunities were greatest.
It was in the larger and more advanced cities that Reform was initially most successful.
Reform began in Berlin and spread to cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt-am-Main, Breslau
before moving to Vienna and Prague.28 Economic growth accelerated after mid-century.
The ‘two decades c. 1853–1873 witnessed the fastest economic growth rates in Germany
in modern times’ (Breuilly, 2003, 206). Urbanization increased at a rapid rate: the
proportion of the population living in towns with more than 2,000 inhabitants rose from
around 26 percent in 1834 to 35 percent in 1871 and 47 percent in 1890. Berlin roughly
doubled in size between 1850 and 1870; Hamburg, Leipzig, Dresden, and Breslau grew by
approximately 75 percent on average during the same period (Guinnane, 2003, 51).
After 1850, German industrialization began to raise incomes, and newly emancipated,
Reform-minded and secular, Jews particularly beneﬁted. As Rahden observes ‘the more
the economy was liberalized, and the more trade and industry grew at the expense of
agriculture, all the clearer was the road that beckoned to the hard worker, and the
more chances emerged for the advancement of Jews from Central Europe ... From the
perspective of many German-speaking Jews in Central Europe, the long nineteenth century
28Exogenous political factors prevented the establishment of a Reform community in Berlin (see Meyer,
1980).
21was a golden age of economic advancement’ (van Rahden, 2008, 27).29 Sustained growth
meant that there was space within society for Jews to move into new professions and
ascend the class ladder (Barkai, 1981). The rising prosperity of the German economy and
the growth of Reform Judaism went hand-in-hand.
The attractiveness of new economic opportunities led religious communities to relax
practices which inhibited economic and social interaction such as dietary laws and strict
observance of Jewish holidays. The ‘need to be economically competitive forced many to
do business on Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath’ (Lowenstein, 1981, 256).30 Reform Judaism
was at ﬁrst driven by practical men rather than rabbis and intellectuals. Freehof observes
that a distinction should be made between the two movements: initally the ‘laity, as
business and professional men, came ﬁrst into contact with the modern age. They were
changed by it and therefore they wanted Jewish observances changed to ﬁt their life.
They conﬁned their interest to outer manifestations of Jewish religious life’ (Freehof, 1955,
354). Subsequently intellectual leaders such as Holdeim and Geiger began to rethink
and remodel the religious foundations of Judaism in a way that justiﬁed the innovations
that had taken place.31 This sequence of events from practical changes to intellectual
reevaluation is consistent with the analysis provided by our model.
Cultural integration did not result in secularization but in a diﬀerent form of religiosity.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, it was possible for Jews to enter secular society
whilst retaining their religion. The new form of Judaism was less time-intensive that
traditional Judaism had been: ‘[b]y 1871 the great majority of the German Jews were
no longer observant of Jewish ritual law in its totality’. But they continued to practice
their religion and were generous with ﬁnancial donations. The urban Jewish communities
29By 1871 more than 60 percent of all German Jews were in the middle or higher income brackets
(Barkai, 1981). In 1871, 43 percent of inhabitants of Hamburg earned less than 840 marks a year. Among
Jews the proportion who belonged to this low income category was only 3.4 percent (Richarz, 1975, 70).
30Lowenstein observes that ‘[t]he causes for the abandonment of Orthodox religious practice were
manifold, but they were often as much economic and social as ideological.’ (Lowenstein, 1981, 256). Mosse
notes that ‘[b]y mid-century, the use of a separate language (Yiddish) had largely disappeared. So had
traditional observances impeding Jewish integration: observance of the sabbath and of the ritual laws,
which had, to some extent, promoted the maintenance of a distinct Jewish economic network’ (Mosse,
1987, 168).
31Moderate reformers like Zachariah Frankel (1801–1875) and Nachman Krochmal (1785–1840s) and
radicals like Geiger argued that the halakhah was manmade and hence malleable; it could be adapted
to meet the needs of modern society. Geiger observed that even ‘when the ceremonial laws were much
more highly esteemed and considered much more binding, the ancient sages said that in fact a Jew
was everyone who rejected idolatry and who did not place another power next to the one God. But
Judaism developed greatly later on, and especially so during the last century. In the historical process it
has reached a level of knowledge which lays less stress of external acts and more on those fundamental
convictions of the unity of God’ (Geiger, 1858, 1963, 240).
22‘now boasted lavish new synagogues and attractive liturgical music’ (Meyer, 1997, 352).
Between 1850 and 1900, 91 major new synagogues were build in Germany—more than
had been constructed in the previous two hundred years combined (Kober, 1947). Reform
Judaism permitted urban and secularly educated Jews to maintain their religious and
cultural identity while also allowing them to proﬁtably participate in social and economic
spheres previously reserved for Christians.
The Orthodox Reaction
Across central Europe, traditionalist groups opposed the Reformers, forming their own
communities where possible. They were called Orthodox or Altgl¨ aubigen (Old Believers) by
their enemies.32 In Germany there were conservatives who attempted to oppose Reform,
ﬁrst in Frankfurt and then in Hamburg. However they were not successful. Reform
triumphed and the majority of German Jews belonged to Reform Judaism by 1900 (see
Lowenstein, 1981, 1997).33
Proposition 2 predicts that if emancipation occurs in a region with an intermediate level
of economic development, λ, then a schism can occur in which high-attachment types
break away to form their own strict community. The historical evidence is consistent
with this prediction. One region we can examine in order to illustrate this point is the
Habsburg empire, and in particular Hungary — a region with an intermediate level of
economic development and also the ‘cradle of Ultra-Orthodoxy, the most un-enlightened,
ardently anti-assimilationist Jews in Europe’ (Lupovitch, 2006, 4).
Development and Schism in Hungary
Hungarian Jewry was inﬂuenced by the German Haskalah movement from the 1780s
onwards. This was initially a purely intellectual movement which did not aﬀect religious
32The term Orthodox or ultra-Orthodox refers to not belief but to practice. Ultra-Orthodoxy involved
‘the invention of a new, more potent tradition ...In order to preserve tradition uncompromised, these
most conservative of men, paradoxically, employed methods in arriving at halakhic decisions which
departed from what had been the accepted norm, not only in traditional Judaism, but also in the more
recent past, in post traditional mainstream Orthodoxy’ (Silber, 1992, 26).
33In Germany the overall movement was in the direction of liberalization. Nevertheless a split occurred
between followers of Reform and traditionalists who came to form a branch of Judaism known as Modern
or Neo-Orthodoxy. The formation of modern Orthodoxy can be dated to a meeting in Frankfurt-am-Main
in 1850, called by rabbi Samson Ralphael Hirsch, which established a separate Orthodox congregation in
1851.
23practice. In fact, the Hungarian rabbinate was initially favourable towards the Jewish
Enlightenment movement: ‘[t]he boundaries between rabbinic and Haskalah culture were
not sharply deﬁned in Hungary and the Bohemian provinces. Signiﬁcantly in these lands
the Haskalah was welcomed without abandoning appreciation for traditional rabbinic
culture’ (Silber, 1987, 113).34 The Haskalah movement was not initially perceived as
a threat to the traditional order until emancipation and some of level of economic
development occurred.
The German Reform movement inﬂuenced Jews in Hungary via Vienna in the form of
a mild variant of Reform, a shadow—in Simon Dubnow’s words—of the German model
(Dubnov, 1973, 126).35 In Hungary, the Reform movement became known as Neologism,
and was led by Loeb Schwab, Leopold L˝ ow and Meir Zipser, rabbis from Pest, Szeged,
and Rohonc. Like Reform in Germany, the Neolog movement was in part a response
to economic change as ‘the modernization of Hungary, from the reform period onward
...raised religious-halakhic problems which had no precedent under the former conditions’
(Katz, 1998, 43). The Neologs did not advocate a radical reformation of Judaism along the
lines suggested by many in Germany. The changes advocated by the Neologs were largely
conﬁned to changes in the practice of prayer, educational reforms and the introduction of
a vernacular liturgy.
Jewish emancipation was completed in Hungary in 1868.36 The Habsburg empire conforms
to our deﬁnition of an economy with an intermediate level of λ.37 Growth in the Habsburg
34Thus Silber observes that ‘[o]ne would be hard pressed to come up with a Bohemian, Moravian,
or Western Hungarian rabbi at the turn of the century who did not display an intellectual curiosity
concerning “external studies,” be it medieval Jewish philosophy, grammar, [or] the sciences’ (Silber, 1987,
113).
35This Viennese model of Reform, pioneered by Isaac Noah Mannheimer (1793–1865), was adopted in
Pest in 1827, in Prossnitz in 1832, in Prague in 1832, and in Lemberg in 1846. Mannheimer was trained
in Reform Temples in Copenhagen, Berlin, and Hamburg. In Vienna, however, ‘he was careful to tone
down the radical aspects of German Reform (such as use of an organ, of priestly clothing, or the imitation
of church songs), and to avoid any changes that contradicted Schulhan Arukh’ (Wistrich, 1990, 24).
36Though the Habsburg empire had been the ﬁrst central European state to begin the process of
emancipation, after the death of Joseph II the process stalled, and political momentum towards civil rights
for Jews only got started again in the 1840s, when it became linked to a more general push for liberal and
nationalist reforms in the empire. In Hungary, those advancing the cause of Jewish emancipation were
therefore allies of liberal Magyar (Hungarian) reformers, who were pushing for national independence
and opponents of the policies of the Habsburg monarchy.
Jews were given the prospect of emancipation when civic rights were granted by a Hungarian Diet in
1849, only for this to be snatched away from them with the victory of the Habsburg monarchy over the
revolutionaries of 1848. A decade of repression followed during the period of Habsburg no-absolutism
and conditions only began to become liberalized in 1859. Full emancipation was achieved in 1867, driven
through by Baron J´ ozsef E˝ otv˝ os.
37The Habsburg empire saw increases in both population and per capita income in this period but
24empire was highly uneven. Heavy industry and textiles manufacturing were concentrated
in Austria and in Bohemia and the latter region beneﬁted especially from the growth
of metallurgy and the chemical industry from 1850 onwards (Good, 1984, 132). Living
standards varied considerably within the empire.38 In Hungary emancipation had occurred
in an economy that was still poor but where some economic development was underway.
In 1870, it was amongst the poorest regions of Europe; per capita income was around
$1000 compared to around $1,830 in Germany in 1870 (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars).39
Urbanization levels were low. The combined populations of Pest, Buda and ´ Obuda was
only around 100,000 in 1830. However, unlike the rest of Eastern Europe and the Balkans,
the Hungarian eocnomy did experienced growth after 1870. Per capita income reached
$1,313 in 1890 and $1,722 in 1913 (Schulze, 2000, 324).40
In terms of the model, the Hungarian Reform (Neolog) movement was an attempt to
reduce τ in the face of gradually improving outside economic options. Their eﬀorts
correspond to the initial downwards-sloping segment of the τ∗ function in Figure 7.41
However, as emancipation and development progressed, the movement towards Reform
did not experience a prolonged period of catch-up growth or rapid industrialization after 1850 along
German lines (Good, 1974). Per capita growth rates of around 1.15 percent per annum between 1870 and
1914 raised living standards in absolute terms but did not generate convergence with the most advanced
economies in western Europe (Good, 1984). The per capita GDP of the economic leader Great Britain
remained 2.5 times that of the Habsburg empire’s in 1913, the same ratio that had obtained in 1870
(Schulze, 2000; Maddison, 2003). The richest part of the empire, the lands corresponding to Modern
Austria had a similar per capita GDP to Denmark in 1870 but by 1913 Danish per capita GDP was
thirty percent greater (see Schulze, 2000, 324).
38As late as 1890 nominal wages in Lemberg (modern Lw´ ow) were half those of Lower Austria (Good,
1984, 122). Men born in the poorest parts of the empire—Hungary, Galicia, Transylvania—in 1860s were,
on average. only 161-162.5 cm tall. That was 3.3 cm shorter than men born in Austria proper, 7 cm
shorter than those born in Dalmatia, and amongst the shortest men in Europe at the time (Komlos, 2007,
215).
39Estimates for Hungarian GDP in 1870 vary slightly. Maddison reports an estimate of $1,092 (1990
Geary-Khamis dollars) (Maddison, 2003). But the lower estimate of $ 978 (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars)
due to Schulze is probably more reliable (Schulze, 2000).
40Schulze estimates that Hungary after 1870 experienced an annualized rate of growth of 1.32 percent,
faster than that recorded in western Austria or in Russia, or Southern Europe, but considerably less than
the growth rate experienced by Germany, Finland, Denmark or Switzerland (Schulze, 2000, 324).
41Furthermore, in addition to the features stressed in our model, the Neolog movement was a response
to the political situation in Hungary. The alliance between Magyar nationalists and Jews was fragile,
and after 1848 it began to fragment. Nationalists demanded that the Jews reform themselves in order to
qualify for civic rights. This was an additional but external and artiﬁcial stimulus to reform: ‘a politically
savvy nobility held out the promise of a tantalizingly near emancipation, but expressly made it conditional
on religious reforms’ (Silber, 1987, 135–136). The nationalist leader Louis Kossuth made the following
statement in 1844: ‘in what fashion could Jews prepare their full emancipation most eﬀectively, I would
reply, “with timely reforms”’ (Silber, 1987, quoted in 137). These religious reforms were combined with a
policy of ‘Magyarization’—which was interpreted by traditionalists as the demand that they ‘completely
renounced their national identity, and to merge with the Magyars’ (Dubnov, 1973, 303).
25eventually provoked a backlash from conservative rabbis.
Traditionalists like Moshe Sofer (1762–1839), known as the Hatam Sofer, the most
inﬂuential ﬁgure in Eastern European Orthodoxy, ﬂed from Germany to Hungary where his
ideas gained greater traction. Sofer insisted that the halakha had to be obeyed absolutely
and that there was no middle way between their strict observance and abandoning them.
All aspects of the religious laws were equal and this meant that no law could be changed
by the reformers: ‘the attempt to subject the fundamentals of Judaism to reconsideration
was itself damnable’ (Vital, 1999, 116). Moreover ‘to the deterioration of tradition in
Germany, his native country, and to the ﬁrst signs of dissolution in Hungary, including
his own community of Pressburg, his reaction was not one of accommodation and change
but rather of preservation by a conscious enhancement of the tradition’ (Katz, 1986, 29).
Sofer’s disciples ‘carried the idea of cultural asceticism and organizational separation to
extremes scarcely contemplated by the master’ (Katz, 1986, 30). In particular, Sofer
inﬂuenced a group of still more radical rabbis who would break away to form ultra-
Orthodoxy causing a schism as predicted by Proposition 2. The leaders of Hungarian
ultra-Orthodoxy were Maharam Schick (1807–1879), Hillel Lichtenstein (1814–1891) and
Akiva Yosef Schlesinger (1837–1922).
Hungarian ultra-Orthodoxy began in a meeting held in 1866 that condemned innovations
and prohibited entering a synagogue in which there were sermons in the vernacular, choirs,
where men and women were not separated, where the prayer platform was not in the centre
or where weddings had been held. The ultra-Orthodox formally broke with the Neologs
and Orthodox Jews in 1869 to form their own separate religious community. Schick,
and the other leaders of Hungarian Orthodoxy, created a religiously pure community
isolated from those they viewed as heretics or ‘evil people’ (Ellenson, 1994, 52). Orthodox
communities were ‘committed to the pre-emancipatory image of Judaism’ (Katz, 1990,
23). The Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox came to view Reform Jews almost as members of
a diﬀerent religion (Katz, 1998, 231).
Schism thus occurred in a region which had experienced emancipation but only an
intermediate level of economic development. The Hungarian economy grew but the
growth experienced did not resemble Germany’s. The Hungarian economy remained rural:
74 percent of the population were still in agriculture according to the 1880 census. Land
tenure was highly unequal; the largest 1 percent of farms accounted for 45 percent of the
land (Good, 1984, 139). Urban growth lagged behind western Europe: only 2 percent of the
population lived in Budapest in 1870 (Beluszky and Gy˜ ori, 2005, 35). Much of the growth
26recorded after 1850 was based on rising levels of agricultural output and on agricultural
biproducts. The largest industry in Hungary was ﬂour milling (0.73 of industrial value
added in 1864-1866 according to Good (1984, 132)). The customs union with Austria
in 1851 permitted Hungary to specialize in agriculture and in industries related to
agriculture, while heavy industry was located in Bohemia, and textile manufacturing was
predominantly based in Austria. Hungary also lagged in terms of investment in human
capital. Literacy rates remained low. In 1880, only 41.8 percent of the population over
the age of 6 could read (Beluszky and Gy˜ ori, 2005, 37). Hence the kinds of opportunities
that were available for German Jews—in ﬁnance and manufacturing—were not open to
Hungarian Jews, at least, not on the same scale.42
Persistence of Traditional Judaism in Russia and Hasidism
Proposition 1 is consistent with the observation that in Russia traditional conservat-
ive forms of Judaism maintained themselves relatively easily without the exit of low-
attachment types from the community. The reasons for the success of traditional Judaism
and the failure of Reform can be examined by considering the social and economic
conditions facing Jews in the Russian empire.
As late as the late 1850s, the ‘mass of Russian Jewry was still remarkably untouched
by the Haskalah—to say nothing of the German Reform Movement— or by the myriad
phenomenon associated with modernization’ (Klier, 1995, 82).43 Reform failed because
42Regional variation within Hungary provides further evidence in favour of our results. The Neolog
movement had support in western Hungary where the ‘majority were materially well situated, having
rapidly established themselves in the commercial, ﬁnancial and to some small degree—industrial life of
the Hungarian state, particularly in its centers in Budapest and Pressburg’ (Adler, 1974, 120). This is
consistent with our model: ‘[t]he diﬃculties confronting the urban merchant who wished to observe the
religious laws were many times greater than those facing the villager’ (Katz, 1998, 43). Ultra-Orthodoxy
was successful in north-eastern Hungary, in Unterland, which was the most backwards and rural part
of the country. Overall literacy rates in 1880 in Unterland were around half that of the rest of country
(Silber, 1992, 42). These were areas in which economic opportunities remained limited and the ﬁnancial
gains to the religious authority associated with reducing strictness were meagre. According to Silber:
‘[d]welling in the backwater of Unterland enabled one to take a tougher stance, one of resolute rejection
rather than weak-kneed compromise’ whereas ‘a spirit of despondency and cultural despair prevailed
among many of the Orthodox in the northwest’ (Silber, 1992, 42).
43German-style Reformed services were introduced in Odessa, Warsaw, Riga and Vilna (Meyer, 1988,
197). As Dubnow puts it the ‘breezes of Western culture had hardly a chance to penetrate to this realm,
protected as it was by the double wall of Rabbinism and Hasidism. And yet here and there one may
discern on the surface of social life the foam of the wave from the far-oﬀ West. From Germany the
free-minded “Berliner,” the nickname applied to these “new men,” was moving towards the borders of
Russia’ (Dubnow, 1975, 384).
27emancipation had not taken place, discrimination remained high, and economic opportun-
ities remained limited. Even for those who were aware of Reform, the premises underlying
the movement appeared inappropriate in a Russian context. It was tainted from the
start because it was seen as partnering the repressive Tzarist bureaucracy. Even after the
regime liberalized following the death of Tsar Nicholas I in 1855, most Jews had scant
incentive to embrace change their behaviour or beliefs because the economic conditions
remained stagnant until the end of the nineteenth century (Gregory, 1994).
Another piece of evidence consistent with our model is the path taken by Hasidism in
the nineteenth century. Hasidism is now part of the broader Haredi movement but the
origins of Hasidism diﬀer from those of other forms of ultra-Orthodox Judaism. Hasidism
was a popular movement of religious enthusiasm that emerged in the Russian Empire and
in Galicia. Hasidism built on earlier Kabbalistic traditions and emerged in the context
of a traditional Judaism that had been weakened by a succession of crises following
Khmelnytsky uprisings (1648-1656) and failure of the ‘false messiah’ Shabbetai Tsevi
(1626-1676). It was based on the authority of charismatic leaders known as rebbes or
tsaddik. Though it criticized the religious establishment: ‘its innovations never actually
threatened the normative foundations of Torah and commandments’ (Hundert, 2004, 186).
Once the Reform movement began to make its presence felt in the Habsburg empire it
became clear that traditional rabbinism and Hasidism had to make peace in order to
oppose a common enemy. As Dubnow put it ‘rabbinism and Hassidism concurred only in
one aspect: in their hatred for the new enlightenment, the Hasklah, that was beginning
to inﬁltrate from Germany, from the circle of Moses Mendelssohn and of the “Berliners.”’
(Dubnov, 1971, 407). By the middle of nineteenth century traditional, rabbinical Judaism
had joined forces with Hasidism:
‘Hasidism eventually became a conservative force ...because of its defense of
religion and tradition against the attacks of Haskalah. Non-Hasidic orthodoxy
discerned in the Haskalah a much greater danger to the Jewish religion and to
its own hegemony in Jewish life than in Hasidism, and, therefore, its struggles
against Hasidism gradually gave way to the struggle against the modernization
of Jewish life’ (Mahler, 1985, 24).
The diﬀerences between Hasidism and rabbinical Judaism were minor relative to the gulf
that had arisen between them both and Reform. This is consistent with our model. The
economic environments in which rabbinical Judaism and Hasidism ﬂourished were very
similar. And indeed, both Hasidism and Misnagdim emphasized high levels of strictness
28τ, both represented forms of cultural resistance.
5 A Dynamic Model
The religious identities formed by the schism of the mid-nineteenth century have persisted
to this day. Based on a 2000/2001 national survey 13 percent of the current total American
Jewish population of 5.25 million describe themselves as Orthodox, 34 percent belong to
Reform, while of the reminder 26 percent belong to the Conservative variant of Reform
that emerged in the 1850s (Ament, 2005, 4–5).44 Religious identities are transmitted
across generations since 81 percent of Orthodox Jews were brought up Orthodox and 96
percent of Orthodox Jews marry other Orthodox Jews (Ament, 2005, 12–19). The schism
between Reform and Orthodox Judaism in the nineteenth century had a lasting aﬀect on
economic outcomes.
This leads us naturally to consider how religious values can be transmitted from one
generation to the next and how this intergenerational transmission eﬀects the response
to emancipation. To model the intergenerational transmission of values, we extend our
model to the inﬁnite horizon case with overlapping generations of agents and an inﬁnitely
lived religious authority. To convey our main points as straightforwardly as possible, we
focus here on the version of our model without exit.
At the beginning of every period each agent gives birth to one other agent before choosing
their level of eﬀort and money contributions e and g. At the end of the period the parent
transmits values to its child and dies. The probability that the child of parent i ends up
with high attachment to their community is f(ei) which is strictly increasing in the eﬀort
parent i contributes to the religious community ei. Eﬀort represents time devoted to the
religious community and it is this time that plays a crucial role in socializing children.45
An additional interpretation of e is that it includes investment in religious education.
Both interpretations are consistent with Iannaconne’s notion that religious participation
44This data is from the 2000/2001 National Jewish Population Survey (National Jewish Population
Survey 2000-01. Strength, Challenge and Diversity in the American Jewish Population, 2003). The
corresponding numbers are as follows: 567,000 Jews belong to Orthodoxy; 1,714,000 belong to Reform,
1,297,000 belong to Conservative Judaism. Unfortunately this survey does not distinguish between
diﬀerent forms of Orthodox Judaism.
45The religious aﬃliations of parents have a large eﬀect on the religiosity of their children. Himmelfarb
notes that ‘[o]ne of the most consistent ﬁndings in the Jewish identiﬁcation literature is the positive
relationship between an individual’s Jewish identiﬁcation and that of his parents (Himmelfarb, 1980, 55).
See Lazerwitz (1973) and Cohen (1974).
29builds up religious capital (Iannaccone, 1990).
To focus on the religious authority’s dynamic considerations when setting τ, we assume
that parents do not consider the eﬀect that their actions have on their childs’ values.
Each individual’s payoﬀs are as in the one-shot game and the distribution of religious
values evolves as a by-product of religious participation. The religious authority, however,
cares about the distribution of values in the population. Facing a sequence of short-lived
agents, the long-lived religious authority takes into account not only the current level of
religious participation, but also its eﬀect on future levels of attachment to the religious


















i are best responses to τt.
To illustrate the dynamic considerations faced by the religious authority, consider its
choice of τt when the state is pt = f(0). Without intergenerational transmission of values,
the distribution of values is constant, so the religious authority simply chooses τt to
maximize e∗
i(τt) + g∗
i(τt). By proposition 1(ii), τ∗ = 0 in every period for λ large enough.
Under intergenerational transmission of values, however, pt evolves with the religious
authority’s choice of τ. If the religious authority chooses τt = 0, then e∗
i = 0 for all
agents and pt+1 = f(0), i.e. the same as pt. If the religious authority chooses τt = 1,
then e∗
i = 1 for all agents and pt+1 = f(1), which is greater than pt. Hence, the religious
authority must choose between liberalizing today in state pt = f(0) or waiting to liberalize
in the next period after building up the proportion of high types in the community to
f(1) > f(0). In this way, the religious authority can enjoy greater ﬁnancial contributions
in the next period. This dynamic consideration may mean that choosing τ∗ = 0 in every
period is not optimal, for any λ.
Let d(βθ) ≡ β
1/1−σ
θ /(1 + β
1/1−σ













This condition holds when the future is heavily discounted (δ is low), the distribution of
values is not sensitive to choice (f(1) is close to f(0)), and low and high types do not
diﬀer markedly in their degree of attachment to the community (βL is close to βH). It
is under these conditions that the religious authority is unwilling to sacriﬁce a higher
30current payoﬀ from liberalizing today, for the greater ﬁnancial contributions that accrue
from liberalizing in the future after building up the proportion of high-attachment types
in the community.
The general implications of intergenerational value transmission are stated in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 For any initial state p0, the inﬁnitely repeated game without exit has a
unique SPE as follows:
(i) There exists a threshold λ1 such that if λ ≤ λ1, then equilibrium actions each period
t > 1 are as in Proposition 1(i), i.e.
τ
∗ = 1, e
∗
i = 1 and g
∗
i = 0 for all i ∈ N.
(ii) If (6) holds, then there exists a threshold λ2 such that if λ ≥ λ2, then equilibrium
actions in every period t > 1 are as in proposition 1(ii), i.e.
τ
∗ = 0, e
∗










for each i ∈ N.
(iii) If (6) holds and λ1 < λ < λ2, or (6) does not hold and λ > λ1, then equilibrium
actions alternate in each period t > 1 between those speciﬁed in part (i) and those
speciﬁed in part (ii).
If development is suﬃciently low the religious authority chooses a strategy of cultural
resistance in every period. If condition (6) holds and economic development is suﬃciently
high then the religious authority adopts a strategy of cultural integration in every period.
If these conditions do not hold or if development is in the intermediate range, religious
communities cycle between high and low levels of strictness and between emphasizing
eﬀort over money intensive contributions. The reasoning here is that when the proportion
of high-attachment types is suﬃciently large, the religious authority has an incentive to
relax strictness as a preponderance of the income earned outside of the community, as
a consequence, is donated back to the community. However, as agents exert less eﬀort
in the community, the proportion of high-attachment types declines. If it declines far
enough then the additional ﬁnancial contributions from relaxing strictness will not be
31enough to compensate the religious authority for the lost eﬀort. Hence it may be optimal
for the religious authority to reintroduce strict prohibitions. These cycles reﬂect periods
of religious ﬂux and the model predicts that cycles will appear in regions characterized by
intermediate levels of economic development.
The transmission of cultural and religious values from parents to children was an important
consideration for Orthodox rabbis in resisting Reform. In our model, we can show that
such dynamic considerations make it less likely that the religious authority will respond
to emancipation with cultural integration.
Proposition 4 Consider the game without exit. Fix a state pt. Let Λ∗ (resp. Λ∗∗) be the
set of values of λ for which τ∗ = 1 in period t in the unique SPE without (resp. with)
intergenerational transmission of values. Then:
(i) For all pt, Λ∗ ⊆ Λ∗∗,
(ii) For pt < f(1), Λ∗ ⊂ Λ∗∗.
Therefore, concerns about the intergenerational transmission of values sustain cultural
resistance for a larger set of λ. In particular, we can prove that when the proportion of
high-attachment types is not too high (p < f(1)), there are values of λ for which cultural
integration takes place in the model without intergenerational transmission of values, but
for which cultural resistance is adopted in the model with intergenerational transmission
of values. This proposition captures the fears felt by Orthodox rabbis who believed that
Reform would lead to a decline in religious attachment. These insights can be applied to
gain further understanding of the actions of the ultra-Orthodox in Hungary.
Intergenerational Transmission and Polarization in Hungary
Tensions between Reform, Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox in Hungary were exacerbated by
concerns over the intergenerational transmission of religious values. Schick referred to the
Reformers as “the enemies of God” and accused them of uprooting the Torah and the
religious law (Ellenson, 1994, 45). He argued that Reform Jews had eﬀectively ceased
to be Jews and that contact between them and Orthodox Jews had to be prevented. In
particular he emphasized that their ‘their sons and daughters are forbidden to us’ because
‘they are akin to complete gentiles’ and they ‘will certainly lead away your son’ (quoted
in Ellenson, 1994, 45–46). Schlesinger was similarly concerned with what would happen
32to the children of those Jews who embraced Reform. He saw Reformers as ‘an evil family’
who lead the children of sainted ancestors away from the heritage of their fathers toward
sectarianism and heresy,’ lamenting the fact that children no longer knew how to say
kaddish over the dead and have to read the blessings of the Torah in ‘foreign characters’
(Schlesinger, 1864, 1995, 204).
In their response to the threat of emancipation and Reform, the ultra-Orthodox elevated
the importance of prohibitions within Judaism.46 Schlesinger argued that a Jew who
did not wear distinctive clothes or did not speak a diﬀerent language [to the non-Jewish
population] ceased to be Jew (Satlow, 2006, 270). Lichtenstein went further than Schick
in issuing categorical prohibitions on preaching in German and in condemning all ‘alien
wisdom’. Non-normative traditions, in dress and language were held to be normative and
binding. Thus the act of emancipation had produced the most anti-assimilationist Jewish
community in Europe.
6 Concluding Comments
In this paper we have developed a model of religious polarization which provides an
explanation of the emergence of Reform and Ultra-Orthodox Judaism in response to
emancipation in nineteenth century Europe. This analytic narrative illustrates how
economic development can generate cultural change and illuminates the mechanisms
driving religious polarization.
In our framework the level of economic development determines whether or not closed
religious communities react to liberalization by adopting a strategy of cultural integration
or cultural resistance. This insight emerges out of the self-interested behaviour of local
community leaders who must choose between a poor and devout community or relatively
rich and less devout one. In addition, when agents have the option of exiting the
community, the model generates a non-monotonic relationship between development
and cultural resistance. We show how schisms can emerge in religious communities at
intermediate levels of development. Finally, dynamic considerations, associated with the
intergenerational transmission of values, lead to religious cycles and support cultural
resistance for a larger set of parameters.
A number of further extensions are possible. For simplicity we have studied the beha-
46Schick stated that as a matter of principle “[i]t is good to elevate a prohibition” (quoted in Silber,
1992, 48).
33viour of a single religious community. Future work might model religious competition.
This could generate variants of Judaism with intermediate levels of strictness such as
Modern Orthodoxy and Conservative Judaism which also emerged in Germany in the
mid-nineteenth century. Extending the model to allow for endogenous fertility is another
natural extension of the model. Ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities in both Israel and the
United States have very high levels of fertility (see Berman, 2000). Higher levels of fertility
amongst high-attachment types could potentially increase the likelihood of a religious
schism as the loss in religious activity brought about by the exit of low-attachment types
may be more than compensated for by a greater number of high-attachment types in
future periods. We have focused in this paper on the accumulation of religious capital in
shaping the character of religious communities. Future work could develop this framework
to allow for human capital accumulation.
34Mathematical Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
We solve for an SPE via backward induction. Let us begin by ﬁxing τ ∈ [0,1] and
analyzing optimal eﬀort and money contributions for each player at date 2.
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s.t. e ≥ 0 (8)
e ≤ 1 (9)
g ≥ 0 (10)
g ≤ (1 − τ)λ(1 − e). (11)
Deﬁne H ≡
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We proceed by partitioning the parameter space as follows.
Case 1: (1−τ)λ < 1. Suppose g∗ > 0. Then e∗ < 1 by (11). Consider an alternative pair
(e0,g0) = (e∗ + a,g∗ − a) for some small a > 0. For (e∗,g∗) to indeed be a best response:
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where the right-hand-side is equal to
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35which is a contradiction, because (1 − τ)λ < 1 by hypothesis. Therefore g∗ = 0.
Substituting g∗ = 0 into (12), we ﬁnd that the partial derivative of the objective function
with respect to e is ∞ at e = 0 and −∞ at e = 1. Together with the continuity of (12),
this implies that the objective function is maximized at an interior e, which sets (12)
equal to zero. That is:
βθe
∗σ−1 = (1 − τ)λ((1 − τ)λ(1 − e
∗))
σ−1 ,
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# ∈ (0,1). (14)
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Therefore, an agent chooses e + g to maximize their objective function. The minimum
feasible e + g is zero and the maximum is one (i.e. when the agent donates their entire
income 1 − e so that e + g = e + (1 − e) = 1). The partial derivative of the objective
function with respect to e + g, (15), is ∞ at e + g = 0 and −∞ at e + g = 1. Together
with the continuity of (15), this implies that the objective function is maximized at an



















Case 3: (1−τ)λ > 1. Suppose e∗ > 0. Consider an alternative pair (e00,g00) = (e∗−a,g∗+a)
for some small a > 0 (this is feasible because the agent earns an additional a(1−τ)λ units
36and donates an additional a < a(1 − τ)λ units). For (e∗,g∗) to indeed be a best response:
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where the right-hand-side is equal to
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which is a contradiction, because (1 − τ)λ > 1 by hypothesis. Therefore e∗ = 0.
Substituting e∗ = 0 into (13), we ﬁnd that the partial derivative of the objective function
with respect to g is ∞ at g = 0 and −∞ at g = 1. Together with the continuity of (12),
this implies that the objective function is maximized at an interior g, which sets (13)
equal to zero. That is:
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Consider the case where λ < 1. Then (1 − τ)λ < 1 for all τ ∈ [0,1]. In this case, we have














. Hence, the religious
authority sets τ = 1 for λ < 1.
Now consider the case where λ ≥ 1. We have established that the most the religious
authority can get by setting τ such that (1 − τ)λ < 1 is n (i.e. by setting τ = 1, so that
ei = 1 and gi = 0 for all i ∈ N). By setting τ such that (1 − τ)λ = 1, the religious
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i(τ)) is maximized, for τ


































































Therefore the religious authority’s best response is τ = 0 for all λ > ¯ λ and τ = 1 for all
λ ∈ (1, ¯ λ]. Consequently, e∗(τ∗) = 1 for all λ ∈ (1,λ] and e∗(τ∗) = 0 for all λ > λ. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Let β
1/σ







σ . We are going to show that all type-θ agents exit the

















σ implies (1 − τθ)λ < 1. We have established in the proof of
proposition 1 that, in this case, type-θ agents choose e∗ > 0 and g∗ = 0, yielding a payoﬀ
from remaining in the group at strictness level τθ of:
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θ or λ ≤ β
1/σ
θ . Hence, in this case, a type-θ agent
will not exit for any τ ∈ [0,1]. This establishes part (i) of the lemma.
Second, by inspection, τθ < 1 for λ > β
1/σ
θ and τθ > 0 for βθ > 0.



















Hence, βH > βL implies τH > τL.


























































Therefore, τθ is strictly decreasing in λ. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
Henceforth set βL < 1. Part (i) then follows immediately from Lemma 1 and Proposition
1(i).
To establish part (ii), let β
1/σ
L < λ < min{β
1/σ
H ,1}. As λ < 1 by hypothesis, we have

















Therefore, without an exit constraint, the religious authority will maximize aggregate
contributions by setting τ at its maximum. As λ > β
1/σ
L by hypothesis, the religious
authority can only set τ as high as τL < 1, while retaining both H and L types (by
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Alternatively, as λ < β
1/σ
H , the religious authority could set τ = 1 and retain only H
types, yielding an aggregate contribution of np.
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We claim that this inequality holds for βL close enough to zero. First, by inspection, the
LHS is strictly decreasing in βL. It is also positive, because λ > β
1/σ






L . Second, the RHS is strictly increasing in βL and goes to zero as
βL → 0. This establishes the claim.
Hence at λ = min{β
1/σ
H ,1}, the LHS of (19) is greater than the RHS, for βL suﬃciently
close to zero. At λ = β
1/σ
L , the LHS of (19) is zero and the RHS is (1 − p) > 0. Hence,
the RHS is greater than the LHS. In addition, the LHS of (19) is strictly increasing in λ
and the RHS is strictly decreasing in λ.









such that for λ < λ, τ∗ = τL and all agents remain members of






, τ∗ = 1 and schism occurs.
Now consider λ ≥ min{β
1/σ
H ,1}. We shall show that there exists a threshold λ such that
for λ ≤ λ ≤ λ, τ∗ = min{τH,1} and there is a schism; for λ > λ, τ∗ = 0 and all agents




(a) Consider λ ∈ [β
1/σ
H ,1].
Because λ ≤ 1, (1−τ)λ ≤ 1 for all τ ∈ [0,1], so the best responses for group members are
given by Proposition 1 (case 1). For each member i, e∗
i(τ) + g∗
i(τ) is strictly increasing in
τ. As λ ≥ β
1/σ
H , however, setting τ = 1 would induce exit by both types. Therefore, the
religious authority will choose either τL, the maximum τ such that it attracts both types,
or τH, the maximum τ such that it attracts high types (only).
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which is less than u(τH) for all λ. Hence, for βL suﬃciently small, the religious authority
chooses τH and induces schism for λ ∈ [β
1/σ
H ,1].
(b) Consider λ > 1.
For τ < 1 − 1
λ, i.e. (1 − τ)λ > 1, we have established that the religious authority’s payoﬀ
is strictly decreasing in τ. For τ ≥ 1 − 1
λ, (1 − τ)λ ≤ 1, we have established that the
total contribution per agent is strictly increasing in τ. Therefore, we are left with three
candidates for τ∗, namely 0,τL, and τH.
First, we claim that for βL small enough τ∗ 6= τL.
Suppose τL > 1− 1
λ. We have established in case 1(a) that the religious authority chooses
τH in this case, for βL suﬃciently small.
Suppose alternatively that τL < 1 − 1
λ. Recall that all agents join the community for
τ ≤ τL. The payoﬀ from choosing τL is then:


















(1 − τL)λ, (22)
which is clearly less than e u(0). Therefore, the religious authority never chooses τL, when
βL is suﬃciently small.
Now we claim that there exists a threshold λ such that τ∗ = 0 rather than τH if and only














































!1−σ ≡ λ. (24)




(a) Consider λ ∈ [1,β
1/σ
H ].
Since λ ≤ β
1/σ
H , the religious authority can set τ = 1 without inducing the exit of high
types. When high types are members, we have already established that u(1) > u(τL)
for λ > λ, where λ < 1. By hypothesis, λ ≥ 1. Hence, τ∗ 6= τL in the case under
consideration.
Turning to the remaining candidates, the best responses of group members to τ = 0 are
given by Proposition 1(ii) (because λ ≥ 1) and the best responses to τ = 1 are given by






































≡ e λ. (26)
(b) Consider λ > β
1/σ
H .
We have already established that when λ > max{β
1/σ
H ,1}, then the religious authority
chooses τ = 0 if (23), and equivalently (24), holds and τ = τH otherwise.
Because λ > β
1/σ
H , an upper bound on the RHS of (23) is np. This implies that if (25)
holds for λ ∈ (e λ,β
1/σ
H ], then (23) holds for all λ > β
1/σ
H and hence τ∗ = 0 over this
parameter range.
43If (25) does not hold for some λ ∈ [1,β
1/σ
H ], then τ∗ = 0 if and only if (23) holds, so that
λ > λ; τ∗ = τH otherwise. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
By assumption, members of the religious group live for one period and are self regarding.
Hence, in each period members choose the same best responses to τ as they do in the
one-shot game (given by Proposition 1). In particular, in any given period, if (1−τ)λ < 1
then g∗
































If (1 − τ)λ > 1, then e∗












(1 − τ)λ. (29)
























is a function of the religious authority’s choice variable τ
and the state variable, p, which is the proportion of high-attachment types in the current
period, p. Hence we can write the religious authority’s current period payoﬀ as u(τ,p).
Let us denote the proportion of high-attachment types in the next period by p0. Recall
that the probability that agent i’s child inherits high-attachment to the group equals
























We can deﬁne the value of being in state p as v(p). Then the Bellman equation for the













L(τ) for all τ.
Suppose λ < 1. Then in every period (1 − τ)λ < 1 regardless of τ ∈ [0,1]. Hence, each
type chooses g∗
θ = 0 and e∗
θ(τ) as in (27) in every period. Therefore, the religious authority
maximizes the discounted sum of contributions by setting τ∗ = 1 in every period.
Henceforth, consider the case in which λ ≥ 1. This implies that (1−τ)λ ≥ 1 for τ ≤ 1− 1
λ.
First, we claim that the religious authority never chooses τ = 1 − 1
λ in equilibrium. To

















for τ = 1 − 1










, which establishes the claim.







θ(1) for both types, and (2) p0 is increasing in e∗
θ for










Therefore, both the current period payoﬀ and the continuation payoﬀ are higher when
setting τ = 1, thus establishing the claim.
Second, consider the domain τ > 1 − 1





































The unique maximizer of the ﬁrst two terms is τ = 1. Since e∗
θ(τ) is maximized at
τ = 1 for both types, F(τ,p) is maximized at τ = 1. In addition, recall that v is weakly
45increasing. Hence τ = 1 is also a maximizer of the third term. This implies that the
unique maximum of the religious authority’s discounted payoﬀ on the domain τ > 1 − 1
λ
is attained when τ = 1.
Third, consider the domain τ < 1 − 1





























The unique maximizer of the ﬁrst two terms is τ = 0. Since e∗
θ(τ) = 0 for all τ on the




is the same for all τ. Hence, the unique maximum
of the religious authority’s discounted payoﬀ on the domain τ < 1 − 1
λ is attained when
τ = 0.
Therefore, we only need to compare the payoﬀ streams under the two remaining candidates
for best responses by the religious authority, τ = 0 and τ = 1.
Consider the subgame beginning in any period t > 1. We have established that in period




























= pf(1) + (1 − p)f(1) = f(1),
where p > p because f is strictly increasing. The same applies for all t > 1.
Moreover, the repeated game has a Markov structure. For each τ, community members
choose the same best response in every period. Hence, the decision of the religious
authority depends only on the state p and not on t. Thus, an SPE will attach an action τ
to each state p and we have established that either τ∗ = 0 or τ∗ = 1.
Suppose the religious authority always chooses τ = 0 when p = p. This occurs if and only
if:
46u(0,p) + δv(p) ≥ u(1,p) + δv(p), (31)
where v(p) =
u(0,p)
1−δ because the religious authority chooses τ = 0 whenever p = p. This in
turn implies that:
u(0,p) + δv(p) > u(1,p) + δv(p), (32)
because u(0,p) > u(0,p) and u(1,p) = u(1,p) = n. Therefore, if the religious authority
always chooses τ = 0 when p = p, then it always chooses τ = 0 when p = p. This in turn




≥ u(1,p) + δu(0,p) + δ
2u(0,p)
1 − δ
































, where b > b.
Inequality (33) can then be written:





As n > 0, this can only hold if:
b − δ(b − b) > 0, (35)
which is simply condition (6). Therefore, if (6) does not hold, there is no value of λ for
which τ∗ = 0 in every period t > 1.




b − δ(b − b)
≡ λ2. (36)
This establishes part (ii) of the proposition.
To establish part (i) suppose alternatively that the religious authority always chooses
τ = 1 when p = p. This occurs if and only if:
u(1,p) + δv(p) ≥ u(0,p) + δv(p), (37)
where v(p) =
u(1,p)
1−δ . This in turn implies that:
u(1,p) + δv(p) > u(0,p) + δv(p), (38)
47because u(0,p) > u(0,p) and u(1,p) = u(1,p) = n. Therefore, if the religious authority
chooses τ = 1 when p = p, then it chooses τ = 1 when p = p. This in turn implies that

















Notice that λ1 < λ2. This establishes part (ii) of the proposition.
Let us turn to part (iii). Suppose the religious authority chooses τ = 1 when p = p and
τ = 0 when p = p. This occurs if and only if:
u(1,p) + δv(p) > u(0,p) + δv(p) (41)
and
u(1,p) + δv(p) < u(0,p) + δv(p),
where the value equation associated with a large proportion of high types is:
v(p) = u(0,p) + δv(p) =
u(0,p)
1 − δ2 + δ
u(1,p)
1 − δ2 , (42)
because τ alternates each period between zero and one. Substituting (42) into the ﬁrst
line of (41) yields:
48u(1,p) + δu(0,p) + δ
2v(p) > u(0,p) + δv(p)





















⇐⇒ u(1,p) > (1 + δ)u(0,p) − δu(0,p)






which holds if and only if ((6) does not hold or λ < λ2.































⇐⇒ u(1,p) < u(0,p),
(44)
which holds if and only if λ > λ1.
Hence, the religious authority chooses τ = 1 when p = p and τ = 0 when p = p if and only
if (6) and λ1 < λ < λ2 or (6) does not hold and λ > λ1. Since τ = 1 induces a transition
to state p and τ = 0 induces a transition to state p, this implies that in these cases the
process alternates each period between τ = 0 and τ = 1. This completes the proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4.
Fix an arbitrary state p. Let Λ∗ (resp. Λ∗∗) be the set of values of λ for which τ∗ = 1 in
the current period in the unique SPE without (resp. with) intergenerational transmission
of values. Without intergenerational transmission of values, τ∗ = 0 if and only if:
u(0,p) + δv(p) ≥ u(1,p) + δv(p). (45)

















≡ e λ(p) (46)
49by the proof of Proposition 1.
When there is intergenerational transmission of values, τ∗ = 0 if and only if:
u(0,p) + δv(p) ≥ u(1,p) + δv(p). (47)
This implies u(0,p) ≥ u(1,p) + δ[v(p) − v(p)]. We have established that v(p) = v(p)
if λ ≤ λ1 = e λ(p) and v(p) > v(p) if λ > λ1 = e λ(p). Therefore whenever the religious
authority chooses τ = 0 under intergenerational transmission it will also choose τ = 0
without intergenerational transmission, i.e. Λ∗ ⊆ Λ∗∗ for all p. This establishes part (i) of
the proposition.
We shall now show that for p < p, Λ∗ ⊂ Λ∗∗.
Suppose λ = e λ(p). Then the religious authority is indiﬀerent between τ = 0 and τ = 1
when there is no intergenerational transmission. Under intergenerational transmission,
the religious authority will strictly prefer τ = 1 at λ = e λ(p) if and only if v(p) > v(p)
which occurs if and only if e λ(p) > λ1 = e λ(p). By inspection of (46), e λ(p) is strictly
decreasing in p. This implies that e λ(p) > e λ(p) if and only if p < p. Hence for p < p, there
exist values of λ such that the religious authority chooses τ = 0 without intergenerational
transmission and τ = 1 with intergenerational transmission. This establishes part (ii) and
indeed the proposition. 
50References
Abramitzky, Ran (2008), ‘The limits of equality: Insights from the Israeli Kibbutz’, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 123(3), 1111–1159.
Abramitzky, Ran (2009), ‘The eﬀect of redistribution on migration: Evidence from the
Israeli kibbutz’, Journal of Public Economics 93(3-4), 498–511.
Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Cantoni, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson (2010),
From ancien regime to capitalism: The spread of the French Revolution as a natural
experiment, in J.Diamond and J. A.Robinson, eds, ‘Natural Experiments of History’,
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, M.A.
Adler, Philip J. (1974), ‘The introduction of public schooling for the Jews of Hungary
(1849-1860)’, Jewish Social Studies 36(2), 118–133.
Ament, Jonathon (2005), ‘American Jewish Religious Denominations’.
Barkai, Avraham (1981), The German Jews at the start of industrialisation — structural
change and mobility 1835–1860, in W. E.Mosse, A.Paucker and R.R¨ urup, eds, ‘Revolu-
tion and Evolution in German-Jewish History’, J.C.B Mohr, T¨ ubingen, pp. 123–151.
Baron, Salo W. (1938), ‘The Jewish Question in the nineteenth century’, The Journal of
Modern History 10(1), 51–65.
Barros, Pedro Pita and Nuno Garoupa (2002), ‘An economic theory of church strictness’,
The Economic Journal 112(481), 559–576.
Beluszky, P` al and R´ obert Gy˜ ori (2005), The Hungarian urban network in the beginning
of the 20th century, Discussion Paper 46, Centre for Regional Studies of Hungarian
Academy of Sciences.
Berkovitz, Jay A. (1989), The Shaping of Jewish Identity in Nineteenth-century France,
Wayne State University Press, Detroit.
Berman, Eli (2000), ‘Sect, subsidy, and sacriﬁce: An economist’s view of Ultra-Orthodox
Jews’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(3), 905–953.
Birnbaum, Pierre and Ira Katznelson, eds (1995), Paths of Emancipation, Jews, States,
and Citizenship, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Botticini, Maristella and Zvi Eckstein (2005), ‘Jewish occupational selection: Education,
restrictions, or minorities’, Journal of Economic History 65, 922–948.
Botticini, Maristella and Zvi Eckstein (2007), ‘From farmers to merchants, conversions
and Diaspora: Human capital and Jewish history’, Journal of the European Economic
Association 5(5), 885–926.
Brenner, Michael, Vicki Caron and Uri R. Kaufmann, eds (2003), Jewish Emancipation
51Reconsidered, Leo-Baeck Institute, London.
Breuilly, John (2003), Urbanization and social transformation, 1800–1914, in S.Ogilvie
and R.Overy, eds, ‘Germany: A New Social and Economic History’, Vol. 3, Hodder
Arnold, London, pp. 192–227.
Cohen, Steven Martin (1974), ‘The impact of Jewish education on religious identiﬁcation
and practice’, Jewish Social Studies 36(3/4), pp. 316–326.
Cohon, Samuel S. (1922), ‘The misson of Reform Judaism’, The Journal of Religion
2(1), 27–43.
Dubnov, Simon (1971), History of the Jews, Vol. IV, From Cromwell’s Commonwealth to
the Napoleonic Era, South Brunswick, London.
Dubnov, Simon (1973), History of the Jews, Vol. V From the Congress of Vienna to the
Emergence of Hitler, South Brunswick, London.
Dubnow, S. M. (1975), History of the Jews in Russia and Poland, Vol. I, Ktav Publishing
House. translated by I. Friedlaender.
Ellenson, David (1994), Between Tradition and Culture, Scholars Press, Atlanta, Georgia.
Ferguson, Niall (1998), The House of Rothschild: Money’s prophets, 1798–1848, Penguin,
London.
Frankel, Jonathan and Steven J. Zipperstein, eds (1992), Assimilation and Community,
The Jews in nineteenth-century Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Freehof, Solomon B. (1955), ‘Reform Judaism in America’, The Jewish Quarterly Review
45(4), pp. 350–362.
Geiger, Abraham (1858, 1963), Letters on leaving Judaism, in W. G.Plaut, ed., ‘The
Rise of Reform Judaism’, World Union For Progressive Judaism, LTD, New York,
pp. 238–244.
Goldfarb, Michael (2009), Emancipation, Simon & Schuster, New York.
Goldscheider, Calvin and Alan S. Zuckerman (1984), The Transformation of the Jews,
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
Goldstein, Alice (1984), ‘Urbanization in Baden, Germany: Focus on the Jews, 1825-1925’,
Social Science History 8(1), 43–66.
Good, David F. (1974), ‘Stagnation and “take-oﬀ” in Austria, 1873–1913’, Economic
History Review 27(1), 72–87.
Good, David F. (1984), The Economic Rise of the Habsburg Empire, 1750-1914, University
of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles.
Graetz, Michael (1996), The Jews in Nineteenth-Century France, Stanford University
Press, Stanford, California.
52Greenberg, Louis (1976), The Jews in Russia: The Struggel for Emancipation, Schooken
Books, New York.
Gregory, Paul (1994), Before Command: The Russian Economy From Emancipation to
Stalin, Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Guinnane, Timothy (2003), Population and the economy in Germany, 1800–1900, in
S.Ogilvie and R.Overy, eds, ‘Germany: A New Social and Economic History’, Vol. 3,
Hodder Arnold, London, pp. 35–70.
Heilman, Samuel (1992), Defenders of the Faith, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Hess, Jonathan M. (2002), Germans, Jews and the Claims of Modernity, Yale University
Press, New Haven.
Himmelfarb, Harold S. (1980), ‘The study of American Jewish identiﬁcation: How it is
deﬁned, measured, obtained, sustained and lost’, Journal for the Scientiﬁc Study of
Religion 19(1), 48–60.
Hundert, Gershon David (2004), Jews in Poland-Lithuanai in the Eighteenth Century: A
Genealogy of Modernity, University of California Press, Berkeley/ Los Angeles.
Iannaccone, Laurence R (1992), ‘Sacriﬁce and stigma: Reducing free-riding in cults,
communes, and other collectives’, Journal of Political Economy 100(2), 271–91.
Iannaccone, Laurence R. (1998), ‘Introduction to the economics of religion’, Journal of
Economic Literature 36(3), 1465–1495.
Iannaccone, L.R. (1990), ‘Religious practice: A human capital approach’, Journal for the
Scientiﬁc Study of Religion 29(3), 297–314.
Israel, Jonathan (1985), European Jewry in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
Jersch-Wenzel, Steﬁ (1997), Legal status and emancipation, in M. A.Meyer, ed., ‘German-
Jewish History in Modern Times’, Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New York,
pp. 5–49.
Kaplan, Benjamin J. (2007), Divided by Faith, Havard University Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts.
Kaplan, Marion A. (1991), The Making of the Jewish Middle Class, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Katz, Jacob (1974), Out of the Ghetto, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.
Katz, Jacob (1986), Jewish Emancipation and Self-Emancipation, The Jewish Publication
Society, Philadephia.
Katz, Jacob (1990), The identity of post-emancipation Hungarian Jewry, in Y.Don and
V.Kar´ ady, eds, ‘A Social and economic history of Central European Jewry’, Transaction
53Books, New Brunswick, pp. 13–31.
Katz, Jacob (1998), A House Divided, Orthodoxy and Schism in Nineteenth-Century
Central European Jewry, Brandeis University Press, Hanover.
Katz, Jacob, ed. (1972), Emancipation and Assimilation, Gregg International Publishers
Limited, Richmond, Surrey.
Katz, Jacob, ed. (1987), Toward Modernity: The European Jewish Model, Transaction
Books, New Brunswick.
Klier, John Doyle (1995), Imperial Russia’s Jewish Question, 1855–1881, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Kober, Adolf (1947), ‘Jewish communties in Germany from the age of Enlightenment to
their destruction by the Nazis’, Jewish Social Studies 9(3), 195–238.
Komlos, John (2007), ‘Anthropometric evidence on economic growth, biological well-
being and regional convergence in the Habsburg Monarchy, c. 1850–1910’, Cliometrica
1(3), 211–237.
Lasker, A.A. and J.N. Lasker (1991), ‘Do they want their children to be like them?:
Parental heritage and Jewish identity’, Contemporary Jewry 12(1), 109–126.
Lazerwitz, Bernard (1973), ‘Religious identiﬁcation and its ethnic correlates: A multivari-
ate model’, Social Forces 52(2), pp. 204–220.
Liberles, Robert (1985), Religious Conﬂict, The Resurgence of Orthodox Judaism in
Frankfurt am Main, 1838–1877, Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut.
Low, Alfred F. (1979), Jews in the Eyes of Germans: from the Enlightenment to Imperial
Germany, Institute for the study of Human Issues, Michigan.
Lowenstein, Steven M. (1981), The 1840s and the creation of the German-Jewish religious
reform movement, in W. E.Mosse, A.Paucker and R.R¨ urup, eds, ‘Revolution and
Evolution in German-Jewish History’, J.C.B Mohr, T¨ obingen, pp. 255–298.
Lowenstein, Steven M. (1997), ‘The shifting boundary between eastern and western Jewry’,
Jewish Social Studies 4(1), 60–78.
Lupovitch, Howard N. (2006), Jews at the Crossroads : Tradition and Accommodation
during the Golden Age of the Hungarian Nobility, Central European University Press,
Budapest.
Maddison, Angus (2003), The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD, Paris, France.
Mahler, Raphael (1985), Hasidism and the Jewish Enlightenment, The Jewish Publication
Society of America, Philadelphia. translated from Yiddish by Eugene Orenstein,
translated from Hebrew by Aaron Klein and Jenny Machlowitz Klein.
McBride, Michael (2007), Why churches need free-riders: Religious capital formation
54and religious group survival, Working Papers 060722, University of California-Irvine,
Department of Economics.
McBride, Michael (2008), ‘Religious pluralism and religious participation: A game theoretic
analysis’, American Journal of Sociology 114(1), 77–108.
McBride, Michael (2010), ‘Religious market competition in a richer world’, Economica
77(305), 148–171.
Meyer, Michael A. (1980), ‘The Orthodox and the Enlightened: An Unpublished Contem-
porary Analysis of Berlin Jewry’s Spiritual Condition in the Early Nineteenth Century’,
Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 25(1), 101–130.
Meyer, Michael A. (1988), Responses to Modernity, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Meyer, Michael A. (1997), Jewish identifty in the decades after 1848, in M. A.Meyer, ed.,
‘German-Jewish History in Modern Times’, Vol. 2, Columbia University Press, New
York, pp. 319–348.
Montgomery, James D. (1996), ‘Dynamics of the religious economy: Exit, voice and
denominational secularization’, Rationality and Society 8(1), 81–110.
Montgomery, James D. (2003), ‘A formalization and test of the religious economies model’,
American Sociological Review 68(5), 782–809.
Mosse, W. E. (1987), Jews in the German Economy, The German-Jewish Economic Elite
1820–1935, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
National Jewish Population Survey 2000-01. Strength, Challenge and Diversity in the
American Jewish Population (2003).
Pulzer, Peter (1992), Jews and the German State, Blackwell, Oxford.
Richarz, Monika (1975), ‘Jewish Social Mobility in Germany during the Time of Eman-
cipation (1790-1871)’, Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook 20(1), 69–77.
Rudavsky, David (1967), Emancipation and Adjustment, Diplomatic Press, INC., New
York.
Rurup, Reinhard (1969), ‘Jewish Emancipation and Bourgeois Society’, Leo Baeck Institute
Yearbook 14(1), 67–91.
Satlow, Michael L. (2006), Creating Judaism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Schlesinger, Akiba Joseph (1864, 1995), An ultra-orthodox position, in P.Mendes-Flohr
and J.Reinharz, eds, ‘The Jew in the Modern World: A Documentary History’, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, pp. 202–205.
Schofer, Lawrence (1981), Emancipation and population change, in W. E.Mosse, A.Paucker
and R.Rürup, eds, ‘Revolution and Evolution 1848 in German-Jewish History’, J.C.B.
Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen.
55Schulze, Max-Stephan (2000), ‘Patterns of growth and stagnation in the late nineteenth
century Habsburg economy’, European Review of Economic History 4(03), 311–340.
Schwab, Hermann (1950), The History of Orthodox Jewry in Germany, The Mitre Press,
London.
Silber, Michael (1987), The historical experience of German Jewry and its impact on the
haskalah and reform in Hungary, in J.Katz, ed., ‘Toward Modernity: The European
Jewish Model’, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, pp. 107–159.
Silber, Michael K. (1992), The emergence of ultra-orthodoxy: The invention of a tradition,
in J.Wertheimer, ed., ‘The Uses of Tradition’, The Jewish Theological Seminary of
America, New York, pp. 23–84.
Sorkin, David (1987), ‘The Genesis of the Ideology of Emancipation: 1806-1840’, Leo
Baeck Institute Yearbook 32(1), 11–40.
van Rahden, Till (2008), Jews and other Germans: civil society, religious diversity, and
urban politics in Breslau, 1860-1925, University of Wisconsin Press, Wisconsin.
Vital, David (1999), A People Apart, The Jews in Europe 1789–1939, Oxford University
Press, Oxford.
Wistrich, Robert S. (1990), The Jews of Vienna in the Age of Franz Joseph, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, UK.
56